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Although it is impossible for a bit commitment protocol to be both arbitrarily concealing and
arbitrarily binding, it is possible for it to be both partially concealing and partially binding. This
means that Bob cannot, prior to the beginning of the unveiling phase, find out everything about
the bit committed, and Alice cannot, through actions taken after the end of the commitment phase,
unveil whatever bit she desires. We determine upper bounds on the degrees of concealment and
bindingness that can be achieved simultaneously in any bit commitment protocol, although it is
unknown whether these can be saturated. We do, however, determine the maxima of these quantities
in a restricted class of bit commitment protocols, namely those wherein all the systems that play a
role in the commitment phase are supplied by Alice. We show that these maxima can be achieved
using a protocol that requires Alice to prepare a pair of systems in an entangled state, submit one
of the pair to Bob at the commitment phase, and the other at the unveiling phase. Finally, we
determine the form of the trade-off that exists between the degree of concealment and the degree
of bindingness given various assumptions about the purity and dimensionality of the states used in
the protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bit commitment(BC) is a cryptographic primitive in-
volving two mistrustful parties, Alice and Bob, wherein
one seeks to have Alice submit an encoded bit of infor-
mation to Bob in such a way that Bob cannot reliably
identify the bit before Alice decodes it for him, and Alice
cannot reliably change the bit after she has submitted
it. In other words, Bob is interested in binding Alice to
some commitment, and Alice is interested in concealing
this commitment from Bob. It is well known [1, 2] that
a BC protocol that is both concealing and binding is im-
possible [3]. Nonetheless, it is possible to devise a BC
protocol that is both partially concealing and partially
binding, that is, one wherein if Alice is honest then the
probability that Bob can estimate her commitment cor-
rectly is strictly less than 1, and if Bob is honest then the
probability that Alice can unveil whatever bit she desires
is strictly less than 1. This paper addresses the prob-
lem of determining the optimal degrees of concealment
and bindingness that can be achieved simultaneously in
quantum bit commitment protocols.
We establish an upper bound on the degrees of conceal-
ment and bindingness for all BC protocols. It is unclear
at this time whether or not this upper bound can be sat-
urated. Nonetheless, we are able to provide a saturable
upper bound for a more restricted class of BC protocols,
namely protocols wherein Alice initially holds all of the
systems that play a role in the commitment phase of the
protocol. We also introduce a new kind of BC protocol
that achieves this maximum. The protocol essentially
consists of Alice preparing two systems in an entangled
state, submitting one system to Bob at the commitment
phase, and submitting the other system at the unveil-
ing phase. We show that in such protocols the maximum
achievable degree of bindingness is related in a simple way
to the fidelity between the reduced density operators for
the systems held by Bob at the end of the commitment
phase.
BC appears as a primitive in the protocols of many
different cryptographic tasks between mistrustful parties.
As such, the kinds of security that can be achieved in
BC has implications for the kinds of security that can be
achieved in these other tasks. In this paper we consider
only the implications of our results to the task of coin
tossing [6, 7].
II. DEGREES OF CONCEALMENT AND
BINDINGNESS
A bit commitment protocol involves three phases,
which are called the commitment phase, the holding
phase and the unveiling phase. During the commitment
phase, Alice and Bob engage in some number of rounds
of communication, with at least one communication from
Alice to Bob. The period after the end of the commit-
ment phase and prior to the beginning of the unveiling
phase is called the holding phase, and may be of arbi-
trary duration. During the unveiling phase, there is again
some number of rounds of communication, with at least
one communication from Alice to Bob. At the end of
the unveiling phase, an honest Bob performs a measure-
ment that has three outcomes, labelled ‘0’,‘1’ and ‘fail’,
corresponding respectively to Alice unveiling a 0, Alice
unveiling a 1 and Alice being caught cheating. The pro-
2tocol specifies the sequence of actions an honest Alice
performs in order to commit to a bit b, and guarantees
that if she follows the actions for committing a bit b then
an honest Bob’s measurement at the end of the unveiling
phase yields the outcome b with certainty.
To discuss the security of BC protocols, it is useful to
introduce two quantities which we shall call Alice’s con-
trol and Bob’s information gain. These quantities are de-
fined under the assumption that the other party is honest,
and depend on the sequence of actions performed by the
party in question. Alice’s control is meant to quantify the
extent to which she can influence (after the commitment
phase) the outcome of Bob’s measurement beyond what
she could accomplish by following the honest strategy.
Bob’s information gain is meant to quantify his ability
to estimate Alice’s commitment (prior to the unveiling
phase) beyond what he could accomplish by following
the honest strategy.
We now present the specific measures of control and
information gain which we make use of in this paper. We
assume for simplicity that Bob has no prior information
on which bit Alice has committed, and that Alice is as
likely to wish to unveil a bit 0 as she is to wish to unveil a
bit 1. We take our measure of Bob’s information gain for
the strategy SB, which we denote by G
(
SB
)
, to be the
difference between his probability of estimating Alice’s
commitment correctly when he implements SB and when
he is honest,
G
(
SB
)
= PE(S
B)− 1/2.
We take our measure of Alice’s control for the strategy
SA, which we denote by C
(
SA
)
, to be the difference
between her probability of unveiling whatever bit she de-
sires when she implements SA and when she is honest,
C(SA) = PU(S
A)− 1/2.
It follows that G(SB) and C(SA) vary between 0 and
1/2.
We quantify the degrees of concealment and binding-
ness in a BC protocol by Bob’s maximum information
gain and Alice’s maximum control, defined respectively
by
Gmax ≡ max
SB
G
(
SB
)
,
Cmax ≡ max
SA
C
(
SA
)
.
A protocol is said to be partially concealing if Bob’s max-
imum information gain is strictly less than complete in-
formation gain, Gmax < 1/2; it is said to be perfectly con-
cealing if his information gain is zero, Gmax = 0; finally,
it is said to be arbitrarily concealing or simply concealing
if his information gain can be made arbitrarily small by
increasing the value of a security parameter N , that is,
Gmax ≤ ε, where ε→ 0 as N →∞[8]. Similar definitions
hold for the degrees of security against Alice. A protocol
is said to be partially binding if Alice’s maximal control is
strictly less than complete control, Cmax < 1/2; it is said
to be perfectly binding if her control is zero, Cmax = 0; fi-
nally, it is said to be arbitrarily binding or simply binding
if her control can be made arbitrarily small by increasing
the value of a security parameter N , that is, Cmax ≤ δ,
where δ → 0 as N →∞.
If a degree of security (such as concealment or bind-
ingness) can be guaranteed by assuming only the laws of
physics (and the integrity of a party’s laboratory), then
it is said to hold unconditionally. In this paper, we shall
only be concerned with unconditional security. Thus,
every time we assign some degree of security (such as
concealment or bindingness) to a protocol, it is implied
that the protocol has this feature unconditionally.
To understand the degree to which a protocol can be
made concealing or binding we must answer the following
questions:
• What is Bob’s maximal information gain, and what
strategy achieves this maximum? That is, find
Gmax, and find SmaxB such that G(S
max
B ) = G
max.
• What is Alice’s maximal control, and what strategy
achieves this maximum? That is, find Cmax, and
find SmaxA such that C(S
max
A ) = C
max.
In another paper[9], we provide answers to these ques-
tions for BC protocols that are generalizations of the
BB84 BC protocol[10]. In this paper, we provide the
complete solution for a different type of BC protocol,
which we call a purification BC protocol.
The above questions involve an optimization over
strategies. We will also be interested in optimizing over
protocols. Specifically, we wish to answer the following
question:
• For a given class of protocols, what is the mini-
mum Alice’s maximum control can be made for a
given value of Bob’s maximum information gain,
and which protocol in the class achieves this min-
imum? In other words, denoting protocols by P ,
the given class of protocols by K, and the subset of
this class associated with Gmax by K(Gmax), find
minP∈K(Gmax) Cmax (P) and find Popt such that
Cmax (Popt) = minP∈K(Gmax) Cmax (P).
If this question can be answered for every value of
Gmax, then one obtains a curve in the Gmax-Cmax plane.
Moreover, if this curve is monotonically decreasing then
it is identical to what would have been obtained by min-
imizing Bob’s maximum information gain for a given
value of Alice’s maximum control. In this case, we call
the curve the optimal trade-off relation between Cmax
and Gmax. Specifying this relation for a given class of
protocols is a convenient way of expressing the maxi-
mum degrees of concealment and bindingness that can
be achieved with such protocols.
In this paper, we determine a lower bound on the op-
timal trade-off relation between Cmax and Gmax for all
3BC protocols. Unfortunately, we have not determined
whether this lower bound is saturable or not. However,
we do find the optimal trade-off relation for a restricted
class of BC protocols, which we call Alice-supplied BC
protocols. The generalized BB84 BC protocols and the
purification BC protocols mentioned above both fall into
this class. In fact, we show that the purification BC pro-
tocols are optimal within this class. These protocols will
be defined precisely in the next section.
III. BC PROTOCOLS
In order to perform optimizations over all quantum BC
protocols, it is necessary to have a completely general
model of such protocols. We make use of the following
model for cryptographic protocols implemented between
two mistrustful parties[1]. The Hilbert space required to
describe the protocol is the tensor product of the Hilbert
spaces for all the systems that play a role in the protocol.
Every action taken by a party in their laboratory corre-
sponds to that party performing a unitary operation on
the systems in their possession. Every communication
corresponds to a party sending some subset of the sys-
tems in their possession to the other party (it follows that
the mere transmission of information from one party to
the other does not change the quantum state of the total
system, but does change the Hilbert space upon which
the parties can implement their unitary operations). It
is assumed that the total system is initially in a pure
state.
It has been previously argued[1] that this model is
completely general. It incorporates the possibility of ran-
dom choices and measurements during the protocol, since
these can always be kept at the quantum level until the
end without any loss of generality. A random choice is
performed at the quantum level by implementing a uni-
tary transformation that is conditioned upon the state of
an ancilla prepared initially in a superposition of states.
Measurements are performed at the quantum level by
unitarily coupling the system to be measured to an an-
cilla that is prepared in some fixed initial pure state.
In the case of BC, the most general protocol may in-
volve many rounds of communication during the com-
mitment phase. Denoting the number of rounds by n,
denoting Alice’s honest sequence of operations for com-
mitting a bit b by {Wb,1, ...,Wb,n}, and denoting Bob’s
honest sequence of operations by {W ′1, ...,W ′n}, the total
unitary operation they jointly implement is
Wb ≡W ′nWb,n · · ·W ′2Wb,2W ′1Wb,1.
The transmissions that occur in each round will deter-
mine the Hilbert space over which Wb,i and W
′
i act non-
trivially. Thus, despite the fact that we have assumed
that Alice implements the first unitary operation, this
operation could be trivial and it remains arbitrary which
party is first to submit a sytem to the other party. If the
initial state of all systems is denoted by |ψinit〉 , then the
state at the holding phase if both parties are honest is
|ψb〉 ≡Wb |ψinit〉 .
It follows that the reduced density operator for Bob’s
system at the holding phase, assuming both parties are
honest, is
ρb = Tr (|ψb〉 〈ψb|) ,
where the trace is over all the systems that end up in
Alice’s possession at the holding phase.
During the unveiling phase, a similar process occurs.
Denoting the number of rounds by m, denoting Alice’s
honest sequence of operations given that she committed
to bit b by {Vb,1, ..., Vb,n}, and denoting Bob’s honest
sequence of operations by {V ′1 , ..., V ′n}, the total unitary
operation they jointly implement is
Vb ≡ V ′nVb,n · · ·V ′2Vb,2V ′1Vb,1.
Thus, if both parties are honest, the state of the total
system at the end of the unveiling phase is
|ψunvb 〉 ≡ Vb |ψb〉 . (1)
The protocol ends with Bob performing a three-outcome
projective measurement {Π0,Π1,Πfail} on the systems in
his possession. If both parties are honest, then whenever
Alice commits to a bit b, the measurement must have
outcome b with probability 1. This implies that |ψunv0 〉
and |ψunv1 〉 must be orthogonal,
〈ψunv0 |ψunv1 〉 = 0,
and that |ψunvb 〉 must be an eigenstate of Πb with eigen-
value 1,
Πb |ψunvb 〉 = |ψunvb 〉 . (2)
As mentioned earlier, we will be interested in a re-
stricted class of BC protocols, which we call Alice-
supplied BC protocols. These protocols impose no re-
strictions on the details of the unveiling phase and may
involve an arbitrary number of rounds of communication
between Alice and Bob during the commitment phase.
However, it is required that all of the systems that Bob
makes use of during the commitment phase are supplied
by Alice. The class of Alice-supplied BC protocols in-
cludes the generalized BB84 BC protocols, defined in Ref.
[9], as well as the purification BC protocols defined be-
low. An example of a protocol that falls outside this
class is one wherein at the beginning of the commitment
phase Bob submits to Alice a system that is entangled
with one he keeps in his possession, and Alice encodes her
commitment in the unitary transformation she performs
upon this system before resubmitting it to Bob. Another
example of such a protocol is one wherein during the
commitment phase Bob uses ancillas that Alice did not
4supply in order to make a random choice or perform a
measurement.
We now provide a precise definition of a purification
BC protocol.
A purification BC protocol. Such a protocol makes
use of just two systems, which we shall call the token
system and the proof system (since one is the token of
Alice’s commitment and the other is the proof of her
commitment). These are associated with Hilbert spaces
Hp and Ht. A purification BC protocol also specifies two
orthogonal states |χ0〉 and |χ1〉 defined on Hp⊗Ht. The
honest actions are as follows.
1. At the commitment phase, Alice prepares the two
systems in the state |χb〉 in order to commit to bit
b, and sends the token system to Bob.
2. At the unveiling phase, Alice sends the proof sys-
tem to Bob, and Bob performs a measurement
of the projector-valued measure {Π0,Π1,Πfail} ,
where Πb = |χb〉 〈χb| .
So we see there is only a single communication from Al-
ice to Bob during both the commitment and the unveiling
phases. In the notation of the general model presented
above, Wb transforms |ψinit〉 to |ψb〉 = |χb〉 , and Vb = I
so that |ψunvb 〉 = |ψb〉 = |χb〉 .
We call this a purification BC protocol, since at the
unveiling phase an honest Alice is required to provide
Bob with a purification of the state that he received from
her during the commitment phase.
IV. MEASURES OF DISTINGUISHABILITY
FOR DENSITY OPERATORS
Two measures of the distinguishability of density op-
erators will be important in the present work: the trace
distance and the fidelity, defined respectively by[11]
D (ρ, σ) =
1
2
Tr |ρ− σ| ,
and
F (ρ, σ) = Tr
∣∣√ρ√σ∣∣ ,
where |A| =
√
A†A.
We will find the following relations between these two
measures to be very useful. For any two density opera-
tors, the fidelity and the trace distance satisfy[12]
1− F (ρ, σ) ≤ D(ρ, σ), (3)
and
D(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2. (4)
The second inequality is saturated for any pair of pure
states, that is,
D(|ψ〉 , |χ〉) =
√
1− F (|ψ〉 , |χ〉)2, (5)
for all |ψ〉 and |χ〉 . A stronger lower bound for the trace
distance between ρ and σ exists if one of the density
operators is pure. Specifically,
1− F (ρ, |ψ〉)2 ≤ D(ρ, |ψ〉). (6)
This stronger lower bound also applies to the mixed
states of qubits. More precisely, we have the following
result.
Lemma 1 For pairs of density operators ρ, σ whose sup-
ports lie in a single 2-dimensional Hilbert space,
1− F (ρ, σ)2 ≤ D(ρ, σ).
The proof of this is presented in the appendix. All of
the above inequalities can be saturated. Explicit exam-
ples will be presented in section VI.
Finally, we present some properties of the fidelity that
will be useful for the present investigation. Uhlmann’s
theorem[13] states that the fidelity between two density
operators is equal to the overlap of two maximally par-
allel purifications of these density operators. Thus, if ρ
and σ are density operators on a Hilbert space H, |ψ〉
and |χ〉 are arbitrary purifications of ρ and σ on H′⊗H,
and U is a unitary transformation on H′, then
F (ρ, σ) = max
U
|〈ψ|U ⊗ I |χ〉| . (7)
Another critical property is given by the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 The fidelity satisfies
max
ρ
(
F (ρ, σ)
2
+ F (ρ, ω)
2
)
= 1 + F (σ, ω) .
The proof of this can be found in the derivation of
Eq.(11) from Eq.(9) in section VI and by making use of
Uhlmann’s theorem.
V. OPTIMIZING OVER ALL BC PROTOCOLS
In this section, we demonstrate an upper bound on
the simultaneous degrees of concealment and bindingness
(hence a lower bound on Gmax and Cmax) for any BC
protocol. It should be noted that the main ideas that go
into the proof of this result are present in the work of
Mayers[1] and Lo and Chau[6].
Theorem 1 In any BC protocol,
i) Gmax ≥ 1
2
D (ρ0, ρ1) ,
ii) Cmax ≥ 1
2
F (ρ0, ρ1)
2
.
5Proof. We begin by proving (i). To analyze secu-
rity against Bob, we assume that Alice is honest. Sup-
pose that Bob uses a strategy wherein he acts honestly
throughout the commitment phase. In this case, the
state of the total system at the end of this phase will
be |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉 , depending on Alice’s commitment. The
reduced density operators for Bob’s system will be ρ0 or
ρ1. Now suppose that during the holding phase Bob does
the measurement which optimally discriminates between
ρ0 and ρ1. It is a well-known result of state estimation
theory[14, 15] that his information gain in this case will
be
G =
1
2
D (ρ0, ρ1) .
Bob’s maximum information gain may be greater than
this value, since it may be beneficial for him to also cheat
during the commitment phase (for instance, if the re-
duced density operators on Bob’s systems are more eas-
ily discriminated at some point during the commitment
phase than they are at the holding phase). Bob’s maxi-
mum information gain cannot, however, be less than this
bound. This establishes (i).
We now prove (ii). To analyze security against Alice,
we can assume that Bob is honest. Suppose that Al-
ice uses the following strategy. During the commitment
phase, she follows the honest protocol for committing a
bit 0, so that the total system is in the state |ψ0〉 at the
holding phase. Thereafter, if Alice wishes to unveil a bit
0, she acts honestly for the rest of the protocol, while if
she wishes to unveil a bit 1, then she applies a unitary
transformationUmax to the systems in her possession just
prior to the unveiling phase, and thereafter acts honestly.
Umax is chosen such that
〈ψ1|Umax ⊗ I |ψ0〉 = max
U
〈ψ1|U ⊗ I |ψ0〉 . (8)
The probability that Alice succeeds at unveiling a bit 0
when she attempts to do so is unity, PU0 = 1, since she
has simply followed the honest protocol for committing a
0. The probability that Alice succeeds at unveiling a bit
1 when she attempts to do so is
PU1 = Tr
(
Π1V1 (U
max ⊗ I) |ψ0〉 〈ψ0|
(
Umax † ⊗ I)V †1 ) .
Now since the state |ψunv1 〉 = V1 |ψ1〉 is an eigenstate of
Π1 with eigenvalue 1 (see Eq.(2)), one can write
Π1 = |ψunv1 〉 〈ψunv1 |+ Γ1,
for some non-negative operator Γ1, orthogonal to
|ψunv1 〉 〈ψunv1 | . It follows that
PU1 ≥ |〈ψunv1 |V1 (Umax ⊗ I) |ψ0〉|2
= |〈ψ1|Umax ⊗ I |ψ0〉|2 .
Since we are assuming that Alice is equally likely to wish
to unveil a 0 as a 1, her probability of unveiling the bit
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FIG. 1: Curve I is a lower bound for the trade-off relation be-
tween Cmax and Gmax for any BC protocol. The other curves
are the optimal trade-off relations for Alice-supplied BC under
different restrictions on ρ0 and ρ1: (II) no restrictions; (III)
both qubit states or not both mixed states; and (IV) both
pure states. A, B, C and D correspond to the points along
these curves where the protocol is fair, i.e. Cmax = Gmax.
of her choosing satisfies
PU =
1
2
PU0 +
1
2
PU1
≥ 1
2
+
1
2
|〈ψ1|Umax ⊗ I |ψ0〉|2 .
Recalling the definition of Umax (Eq.(8)), and making use
of Uhlmann’s theorem (Eq.(7)), we conclude that Alice’s
control for this particular strategy satisfies
C ≥ 1
2
F (ρ0, ρ1)
2
.
Alice’s maximum control may be greater than this bound,
since she may be able to cheat during the commitment
and unveiling phases as well, but it cannot be less. This
establishes (ii). 
It is common in quantum information theory to ques-
tion the degree to which the sharing of prior entangle-
ment enhances one’s ability to perform information pro-
cessing tasks. With this in mind it is perhaps interesting
to note that the proof of Theorem 1 makes no restriction
on |ψinit〉. Thus theorem 1 applies even if Alice and Bob
share entangled states that they both trust prior to the
initialization of the BC protocol.
Corollary 1 In any BC protocol, the optimal trade-off
between Gmax and Cmax is a curve satisfying
2Gmax +
√
2Cmax ≥ 1.
(the lower bound corresponds to curve I in Fig. 1).
6Proof: This follows from Theorem 1 and Eq. (3). 
It is well-known[1, 2] that it is impossible to have a
BC protocol that is both arbitrarily concealing and ar-
bitrarily binding, that is, one for which Gmax ≤ ε and
Cmax ≤ δ for arbitrarily small ε and δ. This clearly fol-
lows from Corollary 1. However, Corollary 1 says more
than this, since it also sets a lower bound on the extent
to which any BC protocol can be partially concealing and
partially binding. Thus, in addition to being able to rule
out the possibility of a BC protocol with Gmax and Cmax
arbitrarily close to the origin in Fig. 1, one can rule out
the possibility of a BC protocol anywhere below curve I
of Fig. 1. The best one can hope for is a BC protocol
with 2Gmax +
√
2Cmax = 1 (curve I of Fig. 1). In par-
ticular, the best fair BC protocol one can hope for has
Cmax = Gmax = 3−
√
5
4 ≈ .19098 (point A in Fig. 1).
In this paper, we do not settle the question of whether
there exists a protocol for which Alice’s maximal control
and Bob’s maximal information gain achieve the lower
bounds of Theorem 1 simultaneously. Such a protocol
would have to be such that Bob could not get any more
information by cheating during the commitment phase
than he can by cheating during the holding phase, and
such that Alice could not get any more control by cheat-
ing during the commitment phase or the unveiling phase
than she can by cheating during the holding phase. It
seems to us that such a protocol is unlikely to exist.
VI. OPTIMIZING OVER ALICE-SUPPLIED BC
PROTOCOLS
A. Optimal degrees of concealment and
bindingness
The main results of this paper are:
Theorem 2 In Alice-supplied BC protocols,
i) Gmax ≥ 1
2
D (ρ0, ρ1) ,
ii) Cmax ≥ 1
2
F (ρ0, ρ1) ,
and
Theorem 3 Purification BC protocols saturate the
bounds in Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Inequality (i) follows trivially
from theorem 1, since if Gmax ≥ 12D (ρ0, ρ1) for all BC
protocols then clearly Gmax ≥ 12D (ρ0, ρ1) for any Alice-
supplied BC protocol.
Inequality (ii), on the other hand, is stronger than the-
orem 1. To prove it, we must consider Alice’s most gen-
eral cheating strategy. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that she keeps all of her cheating actions at the
quantum level. During the commitment phase, Alice can
cheat by implementing a sequence of unitary operations
{W˜1, . . . , W˜n} different from the honest sequence. She
can cheat at the end of the holding phase by implement-
ing a unitary transformation Ub ⊗ I that depends on the
bit b she would like to unveil. Finally, she can cheat dur-
ing the unveiling phase by implementing a sequence of
unitary operations {V˜b,1, . . . , V˜b,n} that depends on the
bit b she would like to unveil and that is different from
the honest sequence. The maximum probability of Alice
unveiling the bit of her choosing is therefore given by
PmaxU =
1
2
max
{W˜1,...,W˜n}
∑
b∈{0,1}
max
{V˜b,1,...,V˜b,n}
max
Ub
Tr{ΠbV˜b (Ub ⊗ I) W˜ |ψinit〉 〈ψinit|
×W˜ †
(
U †b ⊗ I
)
V˜ †b },
where
W˜ ≡ W ′nW˜n · · ·W ′2W˜2W ′1W˜1, and
V˜b ≡ V ′nV˜b,n · · ·V ′2 V˜b,2V ′1 V˜b,1.
W˜ and V˜b are the total unitary operations that Alice and
Bob jointly implement given that Bob is honest and Alice
cheats.
We begin by optimizing over Alice’s cheating strategy
during the commitment phase. It turns out that the as-
sumption of an Alice-supplied protocol allows us to re-
place the maximization over {W˜1, . . . , W˜n} by a maxi-
mization over all unitary operations on the total system.
This means that Alice has as much cheating power in an
arbitrary Alice-supplied protocol as she does in a proto-
col where Bob does not play any role in the commitment
phase. The reason is that Alice can bring about any
unitary operation W by implementing the sequence of
operations
W˜1 = (W
′
n · · ·W ′1)−1W
W˜i = I for i 6= 1.
This result only applies for Alice-supplied BC protocols,
since Alice must initially have access to all the systems
that will appear in the commitment phase in order to
implement W˜1. We can conclude that
PmaxU =
1
2
max
W
∑
b∈{0,1}
max
{V˜b,1,...,V˜b,n}
max
Ub
Tr(ΠbV˜b (Ub ⊗ I)W |ψinit〉 〈ψinit|
×W †
(
U †b ⊗ I
)
V˜ †b ).
We now consider the unveiling measurement. Eq.(2)
implies that the honest state at the end of the unveiling
phase, |ψunvb 〉 must be an eigenstate of Πb. Thus,
Πb = |ψunvb 〉 〈ψunvb |+ Γb,
7for some non-negative operator Γb. It follows that
PmaxU ≥
1
2
max
W
∑
b∈{0,1}
max
{V˜b,1,...,V˜b,n}
max
Ub∣∣∣〈ψunvb |V˜b (Ub ⊗ I)W |ψinit〉∣∣∣2 .
Clearly the maximum over {V˜b,1, . . . , V˜b,n} must be
greater than or equal to the value for {Vb,1, . . . , Vb,n}, the
honest sequence of operations for unveiling bit b. Thus,
PmaxU ≥
1
2
max
W
∑
b∈{0,1}
max
Ub
|〈ψunvb |Vb (Ub ⊗ I)W |ψinit〉|2 .
Since W varies over all unitary operators, we can write
|ψ〉 =W |ψinit〉 and vary over all |ψ〉 . Making use of the
fact that |ψunvb 〉 = Vb |ψb〉 (Eq.(1)), we have
PmaxU ≥
1
2
max
|ψ〉
∑
b∈{0,1}
max
Ub
|〈ψb| (Ub ⊗ I) |ψ〉|2 . (9)
We perform the maximization over |ψ〉 for a given U0
and U1. By a variational approach, it is easy to show
that the optimal |ψ〉 has the form (up to an arbitrary
overall phase)
|ψmax〉 =
∣∣∣ψ˜0〉+ e−i arg(〈ψ˜0|ψ˜1〉) ∣∣∣ψ˜1〉
√
2
√
1 +
∣∣∣〈ψ˜0|ψ˜1〉∣∣∣
, (10)
where ∣∣∣ψ˜0〉 = (U0 ⊗ I) |ψ0〉∣∣∣ψ˜1〉 = (U1 ⊗ I) |ψ1〉 .
It follows that
PmaxU ≥
1
2
(
1 + max
U0,U1
|〈ψ0|U0U1 ⊗ I |ψ1〉|
)
. (11)
Inequality (ii) now follows trivially from Uhlmann’s the-
orem and the definition of Alice’s control.
Proof of Theorem 3. Recall the definition of a
purification BC protocol, provided in section III. If Alice
is honest she prepares the proof-token composite in either
|χ0〉 or |χ1〉 and submits the token system to Bob. In
this case, the reduced density operators ρ0 and ρ1 that
describe the token system are simply the trace over the
proof system of |χ0〉 and |χ1〉, that is,
ρb = Trp (|χb〉 〈χb|) .
The only cheating strategy available to Bob is to try
to estimate the state of the token system, that is, to
discriminate ρ0 and ρ1. It follows from state estimation
theory that his maximum information gain is Gmax =
1
2D (ρ0, ρ1) and is achieved by performing a Helstrom
measurement[14, 15].
Alice can cheat in two ways in a purification BC pro-
tocol. She can cheat during the commitment phase by
preparing the total system in a state |ψ〉 that is different
from |χ0〉 or |χ1〉 , and she can cheat just prior to the
unveiling phase by implementing a unitary operation Ub
on the proof system. The identity of Ub can of course
depend on which bit b she wishes to unveil.
Recalling that Πb = |χb〉 〈χb| , Alice’s maximum prob-
ability of unveiling whatever bit she desires is
PmaxU = max|ψ〉
∑
b∈{0,1}
1
2
max
Ub
|〈χb|Ub ⊗ I|ψ〉|2 .
Defining ρ ≡ Trp (|ψ〉 〈ψ|) and making use of Uhlmann’s
theorem, we obtain
PmaxU =
1
2
max
ρ
(
F (ρ, ρ0)
2 + F (ρ, ρ0)
2
)
.
It now follows trivially from Lemma 2 and the definition
of the control that Cmax = 12F (ρ0, ρ1). Alice achieves
this control by implementing any unitary operations U0
and U1 that satisfy U0U1 = U
max where Umax is defined
in Eq.(8), and by initially preparing the state |ψmax〉 of
Eq.(10) with |ψb〉 = |χb〉 . 
B. Optimal trade-off relations
Given theorem 3, it is straightforward to determine the
optimal trade-off relations between Gmax and Cmax for
various restrictions on the states of Bob’s system at the
holding phase.
Corollary 2 In Alice-supplied BC protocols where ρ0
and ρ1 are arbitrary, the optimal trade-off is
Gmax + Cmax =
1
2
(This corresponds to curve II in Fig. 1).
Proof. This follows from theorem 3 and Eq.(3). 
Corollary 3 In Alice-supplied BC protocols where ρ0
and ρ1 either (1) have supports that lie in a single
2 dimensional Hilbert space, or (2) are not both
mixed, the optimal trade-off is
Gmax + 2(Cmax)2 =
1
2
.
(This corresponds to curve III in Fig. 1).
Proof. This follows from theorem 3, Eq.(6) and
Lemma 1. 
8Corollary 4 In Alice-supplied BC protocols where ρ0
and ρ1 are both pure states, the optimal trade-off
is
(Gmax)
2
+ (Cmax)
2
=
1
4
.
(This corresponds to curve IV in Fig. 1).
Proof. This follows from theorem 3 and Eq.(5). 
We now provide simple examples of protocols that
achieve the optimal trade-offs of Corollaries 2-4.
To achieve the optimal trade-off of Corollary 2, it suf-
fices to consider a purification BC protocol where ρ0 and
ρ1 saturate the inequality of Eq.(3). The simplest ex-
ample makes use of commuting density operators in a 3
dimensional Hilbert space. Specifically,
ρ0 =

 λ 0 00 1− λ 0
0 0 0

 and ρ1 =

 0 0 00 1− λ 0
0 0 λ

 .
It is straightforward to show that D (ρ0, ρ1) = λ and
F (ρ0, ρ1) = 1 − λ, which implies that D (ρ0, ρ1) +
F (ρ0, ρ1) = 1. It is worth emphasizing that a 3 dimen-
sional Hilbert space is the smallest space in which this
bound can be saturated, since states in a 2 dimensional
Hilbert space must satisfy lemma 1.
We now provide a specific example of a family of pro-
tocols that achieve the optimal trade-off of Corollary 3.
We consider purification BC protocols wherein
ρ0 =
(
1 0
0 0
)
and ρ1 =
(
λ 0
0 1− λ
)
.
Note that this example qualifies both as an example
where ρ0 and ρ1 have supports that lie in the same 2 di-
mensional Hilbert space, and as an example where one of
ρ0 and ρ1 is pure. It is easy to see that D (ρ0, ρ1) = 1−λ
and F (ρ0, ρ1) =
√
λ. Thus, we have saturated the lower
bounds in Eq.(6) and lemma 1, and consequently, this
family of protocols is optimal for the specified restric-
tions on ρ0 and ρ1.
It is trivial to find BC protocols that achieve the opti-
mal trade-off of Corollary 4. Any purification BC proto-
col where ρ0 and ρ1 are pure states will do. Specifically,
if
ρ0 = |0〉 〈0| and ρ1 = |φ〉 〈φ| ,
where |φ〉 = cosφ |0〉+ sinφ |1〉 , then one achieves every
point on the curve (Cmax)
2
+ (Gmax)
2
= 14 by varying
over φ in the range 0 to π/2.
If we define a ‘fair’ BC protocol to be one where
Cmax = Gmax, then by substituting this identity into the
trade-off relations presented above, we obtain the follow-
ing results. The best fair BC protocol from among the
class of Alice-supplied BC protocols has Cmax = Gmax =
0.25 (point A on Fig. 1). The best fair BC protocol from
among the class of Alice-supplied BC protocols where ρ0
and ρ1 are both qubit states or at least one of ρ0 and ρ1
is pure has Cmax = Gmax =
√
5−1
4 ≃ . 30902 (point B on
Fig. 1). Finally, the best fair BC protocol from among
the class of Alice-supplied BC protocols where ρ0 and ρ1
are both pure states has Cmax = Gmax = 1
2
√
2
≃ . 35355
(point C on Fig. 1).
VII. SIGNIFICANCE FOR COIN TOSSING
We briefly discuss the relevance of these results to coin
tossing[6, 7, 16]. Coin tossing(CT) is a cryptographic
task wherein at the end of the protocol both parties
decide, based on the outcome of their measurements,
whether they have won, lost, or detected the other party
cheating. If neither party is caught cheating, then the
protocol must be such that the two parties agree on who
won the coin toss. We can define a party’s bias in a CT
protocol as the difference between their probability of
winning and 1/2. A CT protocol with maximum bias α
for Alice and maximum bias β for Bob is one where if Bob
is honest, the maximum Alice can make her probability
of winning is 12 +α, and if Alice is honest, the maximum
Bob can make his probability of winning is 12 + β. CT
can be built upon BC as follows. After the commitment
phase, Bob sends Alice a bit which represents his guess
of her commitment. If his guess corresponds to the bit
Alice unveils, he wins the coin toss; if not, Alice wins.
Our results show that it is possible to build a secure CT
protocol for any pair of biases satisfying α + β ≥ 1/2,
and that this inequality can be saturated. In particular,
a fair CT protocol with both biases equal to 0.25 can be
built up in this way.
Since CT is a weaker primitive than BC[16], the im-
possibility of a BC protocol that is arbitrarily concealing
and binding does not imply the impossibility of a CT pro-
tocol with arbitrarily small biases for both parties[17].
Whether such a protocol is possible remains an open
question in quantum cryptography.
It should be noted that even if such a CT protocol
does not exist, the fact that there exist CT protocols
with bounded biases for both parties is still potentially
very useful. For instance, these can provide protocols for
gambling[18] wherein both parties (the casino and the
gambler) can be assured that their probability of winning
is greater than some bound, regardless of the actions of
the other party.
VIII. RELATED OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS
The central result of this paper has been themaximiza-
tion of Alice’s control for certain BC protocols. However,
Alice may wish to sacrifice some control in order to reduce
her probability of being caught cheating. Specifically, if
Alice assigns costs to the various outcomes of a BC proto-
9col, then in order to optimize her costs she must know the
minimum probability of being caught cheating for every
possible degree of control. Since this probability quanti-
fies the degree to which she has ‘disturbed’ the outcome
of the protocol from what it would have been had she
been honest, we may call the result of this optimization
problem the control vs. disturbance relation.
It is also interesting to consider a simple generaliza-
tion of BC (which one might call ‘integer commitment’),
wherein Alice seeks to unveil one of a set of more than two
integers (rather than just ‘0’ or ‘1’), and to consider the
generalization of the optimization problems mentionned
above, namely, the problems of determining the maxi-
mum probability that Alice can successfully unveil the
integer of her choosing. and the minimal probability of
being caught cheating for every possible probability of
success.
These optimization problems have obvious analogies
in the context of quantum state estimation. When dis-
criminating a set of states, one often seeks to determine
both the maximum probability of correctly estimating
the state (the maximum information gain), as well as the
minimum disturbance upon the system that is incurred
for every possible degree of information gain (the infor-
mation gain vs. disturbance relation). This suggests that
it may be fruitful to pursue the analogy between the no-
tions of control and information gain in more detail. In
future work we hope to consider these optimization prob-
lems in the context of purification BC protocols.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have studied the extent to which BC protocols can
be made simultaneously both partially concealing and
partially binding. The degrees of concealment and bind-
ingness were quantified by Bob’s maximum information
gain about the bit committed and Alice’s maximum con-
trol over the bit she unveils. A lower bound on Alice’s
maximum control and Bob’s maximum information gain
for any BC protocol has been derived, although it is
not known whether or not this bound can be saturated.
A stronger lower bound was obtained for a restricted
class of BC protocols, called ‘Alice-supplied’ protocols,
wherein Alice provides Bob with all of the systems that
he makes use of during the commitment phase. Moreover,
this lower bound has been shown to be saturated by what
we have called a ‘purification’ BC protocol, wherein an
honest Alice must prove her commitment to Bob by pro-
viding him with a purification of the state she submitted
to him during the commitment phase.
We have also considered the trade-off between conceal-
ment and bindingness for Alice-supplied BC protocols
given different constraints on ρ0 and ρ1 (these are the
states of the systems in Bob’s possession during the hold-
ing phase given commitments of 0 and 1 respectively).
Such constraints might arise from practical restrictions
on the physical implementation of a BC protocol. We
have shown that for BC protocols where ρ0 and ρ1 have
supports in a single 2D Hilbert space, or wherein ρ0 and
ρ1 are not both mixed, one cannot achieve the optimal
trade-off relation (that is, the optimal degree of binding-
ness for every degree of concealment). Using protocols
wherein ρ0 and ρ1 are both pure, one does even worse.
The optimal trade-off for Alice-supplied BC protocols is
Cmax+Gmax = 12 and can be achieved using a purification
BC protocol wherein ρ0 and ρ1 are mixed but commuting
states of a 3-dimensional Hilbert space.
The following question concerning the degrees of con-
cealment and bindingness in BC protocols remains unan-
swered: do there exist any BC protocols with a trade-off
relation that is better than the linear trade-off relation
Cmax + Gmax = 12? In order to settle this question, the
scope of our analysis must be extended beyond Alice-
supplied protocols. We conjecture that the linear trade-
off is in fact the optimal trade-off from among all BC
protocols.
We end with some comments on the broader signifi-
cance of the results of this paper. Alice’s cheating strat-
egy in a BC protocol is an example of a task that can be
described as the preparation of quantum states at a re-
mote location. There are many tasks of this sort, which
differ in the constraints imposed upon the ‘preparer’.
These constraints may specify what is known about the
state to be prepared, whether the parties involved in its
implementation are cooperative or adversarial, and how
much resource material is available, such as the num-
ber of classical or quantum bits that can be exchanged,
and the amount of prior entanglement the parties share.
For instance, in purification BC protocols, Alice seeks to
maximize her probability of remotely preparing one of
two states of a bipartite system (which may be entan-
gled), given that Bob is adversarial and given that she
only learns which state she wishes to prepare after she
has already submitted half of the system. (Equivalently,
one may say that the states which Alice must remotely
prepare are improper mixed states, and that she proves
that she has done so by providing purifications of these
states.) There has also been interest recently in a dif-
ferent sort of task involving the preparation of quantum
states at a remote location [19]. In this task, the par-
ties are cooperative and the optimization problem to be
solved is the minimization of the number of classical bits
of communication asymptotically required to remotely
prepare a state for a given amount of prior entanglement.
Although this task has been called ‘remote state prepa-
ration’, this term may be better suited as a label for all
tasks involving the preparation of quantum states at a
remote location, just as the term ‘state estimation’ refers
to many tasks differing in the constraints imposed on the
‘estimator’.
We feel that the general problem of remote state prepa-
ration may be, in some sense, as fundamental in quan-
tum mechanics as the general problem of state estima-
tion. In particular, a greater understanding of remote
state preparation may have significance for foundational
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research. It has been proposed [20] that the structure of
quantum mechanics might be deduced from some simple
information-theoretic principles, for instance, assump-
tions about how well information can be gathered, ma-
nipulated and stored in our universe. Critical to the pro-
gram is determining the extent to which various infor-
mation processing tasks can be successfully implemented
using quantum resources. The implications of our results
for various cryptographic tasks constitute a contribution
to this endeavour. Ultimately however, the program re-
quires understanding the success of all achievable tasks
in terms of a few simple facts about information process-
ing, for instance, facts about a few ‘primitive’ tasks. It
has been speculated by Fuchs that the task of state es-
timation is such a primitive. We add to this our own
speculation, namely, that the task of preparing quantum
states at a remote location is another such primitive.
Note added. After the completion of this research the
authors were informed[21] of related results obtained by
A. Ambainis on fair coin tossing protocols with bounded
biases.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The density operators for qubits
can be represented by vectors on the Bloch sphere. If ρ
and σ are represented by vectors ~r and ~s, then in terms
of these, the trace distance and fidelity squared can be
written as [11, 13]
D(ρ, σ) =
1
2
|~r − ~s| ,
F (ρ, σ)2 =
1
2
(
1 + ~r · ~s+
√(
1− |~r|2
)(
1− |~s|2
))
.
Defining r = |~r| , s = |~s| and cosφ = ~r · ~s/rs, we have
D + F 2 =
1
2
√
r2 + s2 − 2rs cosφ
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+
1
2
(
1 + rs cosφ+
√
(1− r2) (1− s2)
)
.
This is minimized for φ = 0. Moreover, assuming (ar-
bitrarily) that r ≥ s, we have √r2 + s2 − 2rs = r − s
and
√
(1− r2) (1− s2) ≥ (1− r) (1 + s) . Together, these
facts imply D(ρ, σ) + F (ρ, σ)2 ≥ 1. 
